The Parti Solidaire Africain only really started in May , but was very successful in the rural communities, as they provided a legitimate and fully Congolese institution to organize and channel a source of national pride and unity, as well as opposition to the Belgium administration.
They allied themselves with ABAKO, which was the other large political party at the time, though there were numerous other smaller groups as well. The Parti Solidaire Africain leadership sent propaganda teams to convince rural villagers to join, finding great enthusiasm for action against Belgium already there.
As members of the party began to protest more and more, they also began to provide functions and services provided by the Belgian administration, such as healthcare, judicial systems, taxes, etc. The Parti Solidaire Africain became more and more like a quasi-government, stepping in to provide for the people, and uniting them in their membership and in a sense of belonging.
Tell this, and re-tell it, to the children and to all those who are excited especially at such moments. In , the Belgian government decided to hold an election that would give Congolese puppets formal power over the governance of the Congo. Only men were allowed to vote. The Parti Solidaire Africain urged its members and the Congolese people to boycott the elections, by not registering and not participating in the election. This movement and protest was extremely successful for a variety of reasons.
The Parti Solidaire Africain was in contact with the Belgium government and did have some negotiations, as they worked out the terms and process of the protest. The Belgian government continued with the elections, not only underestimating the clout the political parties, but also the passion of the people. Many people were tempted by the idea of an election that promised genuine self-governance, so the Parti Solidaire Africain had to work extremely hard explaining the deception.
While Belgium tried at first to arrest Congolese men who tried to avoid registering for the election, they soon found that it was difficult to catch everyone, since so many Congolese men were complicit in the protest.
The Belgium administration issued the threat of seven days in prison and a fine of francs. Although many men were arrested, especially in the more rural areas, the boycott persisted and was enormously successful. Approximately 5. The overwhelming success of the boycott proved to the Belgian administration that Congo was ungovernable for them.
Deciding against a bloody and possibly drawn out and politically costly affair to make the Congolese comply, like the war in Algeria, the administration chose to cut the increasingly unprofitable colony. Moreover, international pressure was against them, as the United States was pressuring European nations to give up their colonies, aligned with the idea of self-determination. On January 20, , the Belgian government invited members of 13 different political parties — 96 different Congolese — to the month-long Brussels Round Table talks.
At the talks the Congolese demanded immediate independence while the Belgian government preferred a process spanning three to four years. Free elections for the government were set for May. However, a rift between the leadership and the masses was exposed once the unifying desire for independence was achieved.
The Parti Solidaire Africain broke along the true disparity of power and influence that existed all along between the elites and the masses and between different ethnic groups. After the May elections, the Parti Solidaire Africain began to fall apart along issues of ideology, power differences, and ethnicity. However, everything was wiped clean when the military, the Force Publique, rebelled and mutinied against the new government and threw the Congo into complete crisis on every level.
The development of political parties and the boycotts were stirred up and influenced by other African colonies, such as Algeria, rising up and fighting for their independence. The goal of this campaign was to gain Congo's independence from the Belgium administration. Time period notes. Time period. Location Description.
View On Map. PCS Tags. Jump to case narrative Expand all details. Methods in 1st segment. Taunting officials. Refusal of public support. Reluctant and slow compliance. Methods in 2nd segment. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments. Revenue refusal. Boycott of government departments, agencies, and other bodies. Methods in 3rd segment. Declarations by organizations and institutions.
Leaflets, pamphlets, and books. Methods in 4th segment. Boycott of elections. Methods in 5th segment. Signed public statements. Methods in 6th segment. Dual sovereignty and parallel government. Segment Length. Notes on Methods. Most of the methods, before the 4th segment, were not explicitly initiated by the political parties, rather the Congolese people were doing them of their own volition, in an unorganized manner.
However, these acts set the stage for the political parties to come in and organize the larger and hugely successful December election boycott. Leaders, partners, allies, elites. Sylvain Kama, Director of National Political Bureau, the part of the party where deliberations were made and votes before party action.
ABAKO, another political party with similar goals. The Eisenhower administration had high hopes that the Republic of the Congo would form a stable, pro-Western, central government. Those hopes vanished in a matter of days as the newly independent nation descended into chaos.
On July 5, Congolese soldiers in the Force Publique mutinied against their white Belgian commanders at the Thysville military base, seeking higher pay as well as greater opportunity and authority. The mutiny quickly spread to other bases and violence soon broke out across the nation. Thousands of Europeans primarily Belgians fled, and stories of atrocities against whites surfaced in newspapers around the globe.
Unable to control the indigenous army renamed the Congolese National Army , the Belgians brought in troops to restore order without seeking permission to do so from either Kasavubu or Lumumba. In response, the Congolese government appealed directly to the United Nations to provide troops and demanded the removal of Belgian troops. Two days earlier, the wealthy Katanga province had declared its independence from the Republic of the Congo, followed in August by South Kasai province.
While the United States supported the U. Lumumba was invited to visit Washington in late July, in the hopes that the United States could exert a moderating influence on the prime minister. The visit underscored the futility of that effort. A flurry of U. Plans were also developed to assassinate Lumumba if necessary. On September 5, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba from the government. Lumumba ignored the decree and dismissed Kasavubu.
Lumumba, who was blamed for the plot, was arrested and ultimately killed on January 17, Over the next four years, as the Republic of the Congo installed a series of prime ministers, the United States repeatedly attempted to create a stable, pro-Western regime through vote buying and financial support for pro-Western candidates.
Mobutu also received funds to help him gain the loyalty of the CNA and avoid rebellion in the ranks.
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